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L Introduction
At its foundations, critical race theory holds that race in modem America
is ubiquitous, that color-blind lawmaking is likely to address only the most
blatant racism, and that any progress occurs only when the interests of the
powerful converge with the interests of the racially oppressed.' Recent events
in corporate America illustrate these key points. First, as ever, the bastions of
corporate governance remain the nearly exclusive province of white males,

* Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; Director, Washburn Business
& Transactional Law Center. I thank Professor Dorothy Brown for organizing this Symposium
and for inviting me to participate. Brian Perkins and Court Kennedy provided valuable research
assistance for this Article.
1. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRIICAL RACE THEORY 6-7 (2001)
("Because racism advances the interests of both white elites (materially) and working class
people (psychically), large segments of society have little incentive to eradicate it."). The most
renowned example of the power of interest convergence is Brown v. Boardof Education,347
U.S. 483 (1954). See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518,523 (1980) (showing that Brown was the "subordination of law
to interest group politics").
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with no realistic end in sight. 2 Second, this racial homogeneity exists with little
overt racial discrimination and few violations of antidiscrimination law.
Indeed, it appears far more likely that board members are chosen based upon
cultural proximity to CEOs rather than color.3 It just so happens that upper
class white males are frequently most culturally proximate to upper class white
males.4 Third, any reform is unlikely unless sufficient political and economic
pressure is levied upon the people with the power to restructure the law in this
specific context. Simply put, this homosocial reproduction will end only when
those with sufficient power see it in their interest to end it. 5 In fact, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20026 can only be termed a wasted opportunity to
disrupt legally the homosocial reproduction that plagues board selection
processes. Reform did not happen because the political calculus governing the
reform effort failed to comprehend the racial stakes of the issues at hand.
2. See Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversityin the
Boardroom Quell CorporateCorruption?,77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837,838 (2003) (showing that
only 4.1% of all board seats for the Fortune 1000 are held by African Americans and Latinos,
and that 90% of senior officers are white males).
3. One may be tempted to think that all of the recent reforms undertaken pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29) (and accompanying changes
implemented at the NYSE and the NASDAQ) somehow had enhanced the "independence" of
boards of publicly held companies. It is true that there are now more stringent independence
requirements for all publicly held companies. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 843. Still, the
independence requirements that these initiatives impose are modest at best, in terms of the real
independence demanded. Thus, a CEO's college friend can still serve as an "independent"
member of the audit committee, and the CEO's father is still legally permitted to hold the
position of Chairman of the Board. David Enrich, CapitolFederalFinancialDirectorReynolds
to Resign, Dow JONES CORP. FILINGS ALERT, Dec. 30,2003, WL 12/30/03 FEDFILE 19:42:00.
4. The corps of senior executives is even less diverse than the corps of directors at
Fortune 1000 firms. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 838 (comparing board and executive
diversity). Thus, it appears that, on whole, CEOs select boards that are only slightly more
diverse than themselves.
5. Homosocial reproduction describes the phenomenon of those with power selecting
those with a high degree of cultural similarity to themselves. This operates to perpetuate
yesteryear's power structure, including its racially exclusive tradition. Business scholars have
identified the phenomenon as a major barrier to achieving cultural diversity within business
organizations. See VAL SINGH, MANAGING DIVERSITY FOR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE 21 (2002)
(discussing discriminatory effect of homosocial reproduction). Legal scholars have recently
applied this "homogeneity begets homogeneity" dynamic to corporate boards. See Thomas W.
Joo, A Trip throughthe Maze of "CorporateDemocracy": ShareholderVoice and Management
Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735,744-47 (2003) (predicting actions of homogeneous
boards).
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29).
7. "[T]he failure to even discuss enhanced board diversity as a means of enhancing board
monitoring and breaking the grip of groupthink in the boardroom is emblematic of a
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Implicit in that conclusion is cause for an optimism of sorts. 8 The political
calculus could have been different and fundamentally more in favor of a
superior outcome in terms of race. Interest convergence theory holds that
reform occurs when the interests of the racially oppressed align with the
interests of the people who have the power to bring about reform. 9 This
process requires that the alignment be fully understood before reform can
occur.10 This in turn underscores the importance of educating and persuading
the relevant powers." Competing interests must be overcome. Alliances must
be formed-and re-formed-as needed in each specific context. In short, the2
interest alignment that is fundamental to convergence theory is manipulable.1
This Article seeks to demonstrate that convergence theory holds the
promise of real and durable reform in the specific context of board selection
processes and, by extension, in a host of other areas that may be key to racial
progress. Part I of this Article posits that CEOs of many of the largest, most
governing elite that still believes in racial mythology." Ramirez, supra note 2, at 865; see also
Richard Delgado, Crossroadsand Blind Alleys: A CriticalExamination of Recent Writing
About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 137 (2003) ("The role of interest convergence in determining
the course of minority fortunes is a well-known tool of critical analysis, useful both in
explaining the course of history and in determining when the time may be right to strike.").
8. Interest convergence theory is not typically cast in optimistic terms. As Richard
Delgado and Jean Stefancic have stated: "Civil rights gains for communities of color coincide
with the dictates of white self-interest. Little happens out of altruism alone." DELGADO &
STEFANCIC,

supra note 1, at 18.

9. The original formulation of interest convergence from Bell's analysis of Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is that the decision "cannot be understood without
some consideration of the decision's value to whites." Bell, supra note 1, at 524. Professor
Bell shows that the decision had value to whites in "policymaking positions" on three grounds.
First, the decision helped America's credibility in Africa and Latin America where cold war
struggles put American apartheid on the defensive. Id. Second, Brown relieved the tension
implicit in relegating African-American veterans from World War II to racial peonage and
enhanced the ability of the military to recruit African Americans. Id. Third, Brown would
provide the necessary social and labor underpinnings to an economic transformation of the
South from a relatively stunted economic backwater to the modern Sun Belt. Id at 524-25.
10. Professor Bell recognized that interest convergence not only explained the occurrence
of racial reform, but also provided a prescription for racial reform: "Further racial progress to
fulfill the mandate of Brown is possible to the extent that the divergence of racial interests can
be avoided or minimized." Bell, supra note 1, at 528. This Article merely focuses on the
logical implication of the Bell prescription for racial progress; the progress will occur when
sufficient interests align.
11. As Richard Delgado states, "moments of interest-convergence," once pointed out,
provide valuable opportunities to benefit excluded groups. Delgado, supra note 7, at 143.
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing interest convergence theory).
Delgado argues that the current war on terrorism may well present opportunities for beneficial
interest convergence. See Delgado, supra note 7, at 138 (noting that the present political
atmosphere may present opportunities for interest alignment).
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powerful corporations in America have exploited America's racial blind spots
to entrench their power and enrich themselves. The Article does not seek to
show that any particular CEO has engaged in intentional racial discrimination.
Nor does the Article even attempt to argue that any CEO is, or is not, a racist.
That is beside the point. The point is that race continues to operate in this
specific context to favor whites and disadvantage blacks. Simply stated, CEOs
seem highly inclined to take affirmative actions to favor culturally proximate
(white) candidates for board membership over (less culturally proximate)
candidates of color. 13 They do this for the purpose of rationally maximizing
their payoffs in a context ripe for strategic behavior.' 4 Thus, this is yet another
context where race matters in our society even in the absence of any intent to
discriminate on the basis of race. Part II concludes that CEOs seek to
maximize their payoffs by playing the homosocial reproduction game.
Part HI of this Article hypothesizes that this dynamic of inadvertent
discrimination can be disrupted by law. This type of legal reform could well
enjoy broader support among key constituencies, leading to an interest
alignment sufficient to support progressive reform. Senior level diversity
serves to enhance corporate profitability, and board diversity should serve to5
quell corporate corruption, thereby further enhancing shareholder wealth.'
Moreover, there is little doubt that race has imposed billions in macroeconomic
costs annually upon our society.16 Therefore, race operates in the context of
board selection to frustrate many broadly defined interests. The sway of race
here, as expressed through the operation of the current legal structures
governing board selection, only serves the narrow interests of sitting CEOs to
maximize their autonomy over corporate wealth and, institutionally, to indulge
racial mythology and allow it to impede economic performance. In sum, there
is much more pressure for potential reform, and little in favor of the

13. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of
homosocial reproduction in corporate management).
14. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (noting a correlation between
homogenous boards and increased CEO compensation).
15. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 855 ("[T]he theoretical case for cultural diversity as a
tool for greater corporate integrity is sound. Moreover, strong empirical evidence suggests a
link between firm financial performance and cultural diversity in the boardroom."); see also
David A. Carter et al., CorporateGovernance, BoardDiversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REv.
33, 51 (2003) ("After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures,
we find statistically significant positive relationships between the presence of women or
minorities on the board and firm value .... ").
16. See Steven A. Ramirez, What We Teach About When We Teach About Race: The
Problem of Law and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. LEG. EDUC. 365,375 (2004) (positing that race
costs the United States nearly $1 trillion annually).
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status quo. Part ll concludes that the issue of board diversity is one ripe for
reform under an interest convergence lens.
The legal issues underlying the homosocial reproduction mechanism have
important implications for corporate governance. This Article raises the
concern that CEOs will naturally seek boards that are as similar as possible to
themselves in all socially relevant characteristics. This Article consequently
suggests that real corporate governance reform should focus on neutralizing
CEO influence over the board selection process and in the boardroom
generally. This may be the only way to assure diversity in the boardroom, as
well as sound corporate governance, at least in this lifetime. 7 Perhaps the most
important suggestion of this Article, however, transcends mere corporate
governance, as salient as that issue has recently become. Specifically,
convergence theory is not just a cynical lens for viewing supposed white
benevolence; it also reflects a historic truism applicable to all progressive
reform. Real and durable reform in America requires the consent and support
of the vested interests and political actors with specific political and economic
power over any prospective reform. In short, convergence theory not only
signals when reformers can seize opportunities, but it also counsels how to
8
proceed: build coalitions of convenience and apply pressure atomistically.1
II. Diversity in the Boardroom and the Games CEOs Play
Diversity in the boardroom enhances corporate profitability according to
the consensus of scholars of business management, finance, and economics.19
In addition, diversity seems to add a dimension of abrasion that can serve to
mitigate groupthink and thereby heighten the cognitive functioning of the
corporate boards. 20 All of this is mainstream management science and is a
logical outgrowth of the now established reality of race: race is a function of
17. I have previously referred to this kind of entrenched and durable racial bias as a
"racial half-life" to connote that, left unchallenged, these mechanisms may project yesteryear's
racial hierarchy far into a "color-blind" future. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 857.
18. See Delgado, supra note 7, at 137-46 (considering the development and modem
application of convergence theory).
19. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 839-41, 845-56 (discussing the financial impact of
corporate diversity).
20. See id. at 840-41 (stating that homogenous boards avoid conflict); see also Lynne L.
Dallas, The New Managerialism,and Diversityon CorporateBoards ofDirectors,76 TULANEL.
REv. 1363, 1403-05 (2002) (explaining that the presence of women and minorities on corporate
boards tends to combat like-mindedness); Marlene A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils
of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1233, 1241 (2003) ("[I]ncreasing diversity ... reduces the
existing homogeneity that can lead to groupthink.").
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legal and social construction that leads to cultural diversity, but it has no
biological or genetic significance. 2' Due to the cultural moorings of race,
diverse board members bring enriched perspectives to the boardroom with no
offsetting diminution of merit, defined in accordance with the institutional
mission of the business. 22 It is not skin color or other morphological features
traditionally associated with race that gives rise to different and valuable
experiences and insights; rather it is cultural diversity that leads to cognitive
skills that can and do transcend race.23
Of course, this being America at the turn of the twenty-first century, many
still do believe in race.24 Because many of these maleducated denizens of our
racialized society are shareholders or board members, the pressure to insist
upon culturally diverse boards is diluted.25 Similarly, it is clear that our
21. See Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of CulturalDiversity, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L.
33, 51-61 (2001) (discussing the positive practical impact of diversity on various segments of
society).
22. Thus, virtually every empirical analysis of the financial impact of diversity finds that
companies that embrace cultural diversity financially outperform companies that do not. See,
e.g., Carter et al., supranote 15, at 51 ("After controlling for size, industry and other corporate
governance measures, we find statistically significant positive relationships between the
presence of women or minorities on the board and firm value."); Janine S. Hiller & Stephen P.
Ferris, Separating Myth from Reality: An Economic Analysis of Voluntary Affirmative Action
Programs,23 MEM. ST. L. REv. 773,794-95 (1994) (finding that stock prices react favorably to
companies announcing pro-diversity events); see also DAvID A. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN ON
BOARD: NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING ....BUT THE BRIGHT THING, CONFERENCE BOARD OF
CANADA i-ii (The Conference Bd. of Canada, May 2002) (finding that gender diversity
enhanced corporate governance); Ramirez, supra note 2, at 853 (finding a positive correlation
between board diversity and financial performance) (citing Amy J. Hillman & Albert A.
Cannella, Jr., Diversity on the Board and Firm Performance: The Mediating Role of
StakeholderManagement (working paper on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
23. See Ramirez, supra note 21, at 63 ("The premise of cultural diversity is that all
persons offer cultural insights and experiences.").
24. Economist Glenn Loury uses the term "racial stigma" to capture the continuing sway
that race holds over the American psyche, even in the absence of attitudinal racial hostility. See
GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 70-71 (2002) (defining racial stigma).
Professor Loury uses the examples of incarceration rates and the greeting received by the
publication of The Bell Curve (in 1994) to show that racial thinking continues to distort how our
society responds to racial issues. See id. at 80-85 (providing examples of racially motivated
policies). This kind of racial stigma distorts thinking across society, including the views that
shareholders and managers may harbor about appointing directors of color.
25. It is unclear, for example, if individual shareholders would vote on the basis of
diversity considerations even if they had the power to do so in fair and balanced corporate
elections. One corporate law scholar has raised the prospect that shareholder votes would
mirror the politics of affirmative action, and affirmative action has a spotty record at the polls at
best. See Joo, supra note 5, at 757 (doubting shareholder approval of affirmative action
proposals). Moreover, there is reason to believe that individual shareholder votes would be less
successful than the politics of affirmative action may indicate. First, blacks invest in stocks at
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racialized society fails to invest in the human capital of minority groups at the
same rate it invests in whites. 26 Economists also have shown that minority
groups generally do not have access to the same social capital-or social
networks-that are accessible to whites. 27 Proportionately, this means an
artificial shortage of elite people of color throughout our society in general, and
for board service in particular.2 8 Thus, CEOs may be tempted, under cover of
these facts, to avoid any compulsion for diversifying their boards.29 Instead,
studies have demonstrated that executives will seek to fill boards with
significantly lower rate than whites. Robyn Greenspan, Black Investors Reduce Stock Holdings,
ClickZ Stats: Demographics, (June 30, 2003), at http://www.clickz.comstats/big-picture
/demographics/article.php/2229601 (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). Second, in
addition to having far fewer numbers, blacks only hold a fraction of the wealth held by white
households-as of 1992 the median net worth of blacks was only 8% of the median net worth of
whites. Lisa Keister, Family Structure, Race, and Wealth Ownership: A Longitudinal
Exploration of Wealth Accumulation Processes,47 Soc. PERSP. 161, 161 (2004). Therefore,
anything that smacks of racial politics is likely to be roundly defeated in corporate America.
26. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, THE
BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1998, at 28 (noting discrepancies in educational opportunities between
whites and minorities). Hammond stated:
[E]ducational outcomes for minority children are much more a function of their
unequal access to key educational resources, including skilled teachers and quality
curriculum, than they are a function of race. In fact, the U.S. educational system is
one of the most unequal in the industrialized world, and students routinely receive
dramatically different learning opportunities based on their social status. In
contrast to European and Asian nations that fund schools centrally and equally, the
wealthiest 10 percent of U.S. school districts spend nearly 10 times more than the
poorest 10 percent, and spending ratios of 3 to 1 are common within states. Despite
stark differences in funding, teacher quality, curriculum, and class sizes, the
prevailing view is that if students do not achieve, it is their own fault. If we are
ever to get beyond the problem of the color line, we must confront and address
these inequalities.
Id.
27. See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 370 (discussing scholarly studies evincing the value of
social networks).
28. This artificial shortage of elite people of color in no way justifies the very extreme
homogeneity prevailing on the boards of corporate America; the de minimus number of directors
of color betrays forces much more powerful than the standby excuse for racial exclusion that
there are not enough qualified directors of color available. See supra note 2 (detailing the lack
of minority representation among corporate directors).
29. This Article addresses only the impact of homosocial reproduction on boards.
Rosabeth Kanter originally coined the term "homosocial reproduction" to explain why white
male managers seemed inclined towards homogeneity. ROSABErH Moss KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48, 63 (1977). Thus, homosocial reproduction may be a
significant factor in disparate treatment of women and minorities throughout the corporate
hierarchy, particularly when senior management signals that it is an expected practice. See
SINGH, supra note 5, at 21 (discussing effect of senior management's implied messages on
promotion).
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demographic and cultural reproductions of themselves. 30 This conclusion
enjoys empirical support from abroad suggesting that the selection of board
members and senior management teams are naturally subject to homosocial
reproduction. 31 It is no accident that boards are not diverse.
After all, most people do not get to pick their bosses. Yet in America,
even today after much heralded reforms, CEOs of publicly held companies get
to pick their bosses-the board of directors. 32 As I have previously
demonstrated, in corporate America director elections resemble elections in
Soviet Russia-there is only one candidate to vote for because generally only
management solicits proxies and SEC rules do not require the inclusion of
candidates running against management's nominees.33 Given this power, it
would be natural for a CEO to select a board of directors comprised of the
CEO's clones. Certainly this would be a formula that would encourage

30. See James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern?: CEO/BoardPower,
DemographicSimilarity, andNew DirectorSelection, 40 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 60,77 (1995) (finding
that "when CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar
to the firm's incumbent CEO"). Westphal and Zajac's study is based upon data from 413
Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from 1986 to 1991. Id. at 61. They define demographic
diversity in terms of age, educational background, tenure with the organization, and
insider/outsider status. Id. at 63-65. Nevertheless, the authors proceed from the assumption
that "in-group bias" is "quite powerful" even when based upon irrelevant factors. Id. at 62.
Therefore it seems reasonable to extend their findings to factors such as race that have powerful
social meaning in our society.
31. See ANNA STAFSUDD, MANAGERS IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC CONTENT 17 (May
2001) ("[T]raditional personal background variables still seem to be more used as signals of
ability in recruitment decisions than others based on context.") (working paper on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); CHRISTOPHE BOONE Er AL., THE GENESIS OF TOP
MANAGEMENT TEAM DIVERSITY 28-32 (Feb. 2003) (finding that top management team
tendencies toward homogeneity resist competitive and environmental pressure to diversify
within the Dutch newspaper publishing industry) (working paper on file with author).
32. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 856-57 ("[D]irectors are selected by management and
not elected by shareholders.").
33. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2003) (excluding shareholder proposals relating to
board elections). Theoretically, shareholders can launch a proxy fight against management to
attempt to elect a slate of director candidates in opposition to management's nominees. Three
factors make this virtually impossible. First, the cost of such a contest is prohibitive, including
postage, printing, and legal costs. See Joo, supra note 5, at 758 (assessing costs of proxy
fights). Second, management may use the corporate coffers to fund its position against
shareholders, and this source of funds will generally far exceed the funds available to dissidents.
See Designed by Committee: Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 71
(recounting a proxy contest at Hewlett-Packard in which the company spent $150 million to
fend off a proxy challenge brought by the company founder, Walter Hewlett). Third, under
NYSE rules, shares not voted by shareholders may be voted by brokers holding shares on behalf
of shareholders, and these broker votes are generally cast in favor of management. Joo, supra
note 5, at 759-60. In sum, proxy contests are not likely to break the control of management.
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maximum, even excessive, pay and benefits for the CEO.34 Instead, CEOs do
the next best thing-they select their cultural and demographic clones. This
effectively achieves the same outcome: CEO power over board selection leads
to enhanced compensation of CEOs. 35 Recent history confirms that American
36 Homosocial
CEOs have received excessive, even outrageous, compensation.
37
malady.
this
of
cause
prime
a
reproduction is likely
Another outcome that could be expected from allowing CEOs to select
their boards would be that boards reflect the cultural background of the
selecting CEO. Again, this is exactly the longstanding reality in corporate
America. CEOs and boards demographically mirror each other.38 Quite
34. Perhaps as effective as stacking a board with clones is stacking a board with other
CEOs, particularly CEOs on mutually interlocked boards. This means one CEO supervises
another CEO and vice-versa This practice, quite common in corporate America, also leads to
higher compensation for CEOs. See Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation
and Turnover: The Effects of Mutually InterlockedBoards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 935,94751 (2003) ("[T]he number of mutual director interlocks is found to be significant and positively
associated with total compensation.").
35. See Westphal & Zajac, supra note 30, at 79 ("[Dlemographic similarity between the
CEO and board members was positively related to subsequent increases in CEO
compensation.").
36. Recent reports suggest that the corporate reforms associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 have done little to stem the ever-rising compensation paid to corporate executives.
Business Week found that CEO paychecks at 365 major companies (in terms of salary, bonus
and long-term compensation) increased 9.1% in 2003. Louis Lavelle, Special Report:
Executive Pay, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 106. The New York Times reported that, aside
from the theoretical value of stock option grants, CEO compensation at 200 large companies
increased by 14.4%, compared to a 2% increase for the average American worker. Patrick
McGeehan, Is CEO Pay Up or Down? Both, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at sec. 3, page 1. Even
in years of significant stock market declines, like 2002, CEO pay did not decline overall, and
salaries and bonuses surged 15% to compensate CEOs for any decline in the value of stock
options as a result of the stock market collapse. See Gary Strauss & Barbara Hansen, Special
Report: Bubble Hasn'tBurst on CEO SalariesDespitethe Times, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2003,
at 1B (providing examples of increasing CEO compensation). It is true that the "outrageous"
pay package that Oracle paid to Larry Ellison ($706 million) in 2001 or the options that Apple
granted to Steven Jobs ($872 million) seem to be things of the past. Id.; Geoffrey Colvin, The
Great CEOPay Heist, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 64. Nevertheless, the stock market crash of
2001-2002 and the corporate corruption reforms of 2003 have not even put a dent in executive
compensation. See Andrew Hill, Buffett Hits Out at Cosiness in the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2003, at 28, 2003 WL 14181372 (quoting Warren Buffett as expressing doubts that
corporate reforms will change board cultures that facilitate excessive executive compensation).
37. For example, 25% of the directors sitting on compensation committees are themselves
CEOs. As such, they have incentives to create upward pressure on CEO compensation and are
cognitively inclined to justify higher rather than lower CEO pay packages. See Tod Perry &
Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder
Expropriation?,35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 128 (2000) (linking changes in compensation
committees with more vigilant monitoring of CEOs).
38. See supra note 2 (analyzing racial diversity on boards of directors).
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frequently CEOs select other CEOs for their boards, and even place them on
the all-important compensation committee.39 It is only natural that a CEO
would prefer someone that is culturally proximate to himself; nevertheless, it
effectively perpetuates yesteryear's tradition of racial apartheid. 40 I have
previously referred to this dynamic as a "racial half-life," meaning an
entrenched social convention that leads to racially disparate results with no
prospect of disruption or violation of law.4 ' If directors select CEOs and CEOs
select directors, a preexisting apartheid tradition can deteriorate very slowly
before giving way to a racially equitable process. 42 Indeed, at today's rate of
board diversification, the arrival of racial equity at this level may be measured
in centuries rather than decades.43
In economic terms, it is increasingly difficult to portray CEOs as rational
maximizers fixated on furthering the interest of their corporations in order to
further their own self-interest, as the once dominant optimal contracting
approach suggested. 44 Under the optimal contracting approach, directors
address inherent agency costs that arise from the divergent interests of the
shareholders and management by structuring executive compensation
packages in a way that minimizes these agency costs. 45 This optimal contract

39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing selection of board and
compensation committee members).
40. With respect to racial disparities in the boardroom, the impact within communities of
color is far broader than just the fact that many board positions are not held by people of color.
The conduct of CEOs in signaling the acceptability of homosocial reproduction likely echoes
throughout the corporation in terms of hiring, promotions, and layoffs. Even beyond the impact
of homosocial reproduction throughout specific corporations, and the consequent loss ofjobs to
communities of color, is the influence of corporations generally throughout our society. See
Ramirez, supra note 2, at 837 (contemplating financial influence of corporations).
41. See Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women out of the Executive Suite: The Courts'
Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267,271-73,283306, 320 (1994) (finding that "traditional Title VII analyses are ill-suited" to resolve the
problems plaguing upper level advancement, including the problem of homosocial
reproduction); supra note 17 (discussing the phrase "racial half-life").
42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing racial homogeneity on corporate
boards of directors).
43. See Baron, supra note 41, at 270 (citing study showing that, based upon 1991
projections, women could expect parity with men in the management of corporate America in
about 475 years).
44. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPowerandRent Extractionin the Design
of Executive Compensation,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751,754,761-63 (2002) ("Financial economists,
both theorists and empiricists, have largely worked within [the optimal contracting] theory in
attempting to explain the various features of executive compensation arrangements as well as
cross-sectional variation in compensation practices among firms.").
45. Id. at 761-62.
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would serve to align the interests of shareholders with the interests of
management.4 6 Since the early 1980s, this model of CEO compensation has
held great sway within the legal academy. 7 The model supports a generally
sanguine view of executive compensation. 48 However, by the summer of 2002,
it became clear that pervasive managerial overreaching outstripped examples of
optimal contracting. 49 Thus, CEOs can, and often do, exercise power to
enhance their compensation at the expense of their corporation. At some firms,
it is now clear that optimal contracts do not curb self-serving CEO conduct, and
"executives may only be constrained by what they can get away with. '' 50 The
lack of CEO enthusiasm for diversity on the board, -notwithstanding the
economic rationality of pursuing senior-level cultural diversity in terms of
enhancing the financial performance of the corporation, is likely one means of
furthering this goal.5
46. See id. at 761 (explaining that the board seeks to establish incentives for executives
that will maximize shareholder wealth).
47. See id. at 753 (noting that the dominant approach to the study of executive
compensation is the optimal contracting approach) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'
Discretionand Investors' Welfare: Theories: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540
(1984); Daniel L. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259
(1982); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 959 (1980);
Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?, in THE ATTACK ON
CORPORATE AMERICA 276

(Bruce Johnson ed., 1978)).

48. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 754 (stating that despite public criticism of the
level of executive compensation, there has been "relatively little attention and analysis in the
academic literature"). But see Steven A. Ramirez, DepoliticizingFinancialRegulation,41 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 503,572-73 (2000) (stating that regulatory competition among states to induce
management to incorporate within a given state had weakened constraints on management
power, leading to the "erosion of fiduciary duties" and "greater latitude" for managers to set
their own compensation).
49. See Steven A. Ramirez, FearandSocial Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics
ofinvestorConfidence, 42 WASHBURN L. J.31, 61-62 (2002) (" [M] anagers now have the ability
to harvest millions in compensation while shareholders go bust. So long as executives of
bankrupt firms haul in millions while shareholders are left penniless, reality suggests that we
have allowed blinding adoration of market efficiency to lead us into the corporate governance
gutter."); Rajesh Aggarwal, Executive Compensation and Corporate Controversy, 27 VT. L.
REv. 849, 869 (2003) (finding that where management holds unchecked power "excessive
compensation" is associated with poor corporate governance); see also Bebchuk et al., supra
note 44, at 846 ("[E]xecutives can use their power to influence compensation arrangements and
to extract rent."); Kevin J.Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: ManagerialPower
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 847, 850 (2002) ("The
[Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker] analysis is comprehensive and provocative, and their evidence
that pay practices reflect more than optimal contracting concerns is compelling.").
50. Aggarwal, supra note 49, at 869.
51. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussing the economic benefits of
corporate diversity); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 785 (stating that CEO "influence"
over directors will give the CEO additional power to extract additional rents from the
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Instead of acting rationally in pursuit of corporate welfare and in response
to market forces, CEO conduct very often seems to be the product of strategic
behavior. 52 It would be difficult for any individual CEO to exploit their power
over board selection in a way that adversely affected the corporation, unless
they could count on some combination of market insensitivity and a failure of
other CEOs to compete on this score. 53 Many CEOs, however, stand to gain
more from nondiverse boards than they would from diversifying their boards,
as demonstrated by studies showing that CEOs of culturally homogenous
boards are paid more than CEOs with diverse boards.54 Some CEOs clearly are
addressing the particular issue of board diversity. 5 At the same time, CEOs
can skirt any responsibility to pursue a diverse board with relative impunity,
even given today's heightened focus on corporate governance, just as they may
avoid pressures for nonexcessive compensation.56
In fact, there is
corporation); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs RewardedforLuck? The
Ones Without PrincipalsAre, 116 Q. J. ECON. 901, 925 (2001) (mapping executive pay to
presence of insiders on the board); MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHLMuLuANATHAN, DoCEOs
SET THEIR OWN PAY? THE ONES WIHOUT PRINcwALs Do, 3 (Mass. Inst. Of Tech. Dep't of
Econ., Working Paper no. 00-26, 2000), at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?ab
stractid'223736 ("By packing the board with their friends.., many CEOs de facto set their
own pay.").
52. I use strategic behavior here in the game theory sense. Specifically, I use strategic
behavior to denote behavior that "anticipate[s] what others will do and what others will infer
from [one's] own actions." CoLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 2 (2003).
53. If CEOs exploited power to attain excessive compensation, capital markets could
conceivably punish firms employing such CEOs, and the CEOs would suffer damage to their
reputation. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 774 (stating that an important school of
thought believes that markets for managerial labor effectively align managers' and shareholders'
interests). Markets have proven to be insufficient to deter CEOs from extracting rents from their
corporations. The fundamental problems are that: (1) CEOs are likely to gain much more from
excessive compensation than they would lose by virtue of their equity holdings in a company
that suffers a corresponding loss of firm value; (2) most CEOs do not generally compete for
CEO jobs at other firms, and to the extent they do, their compensation has been shown to
increase at the new firm; (3) CEOs do not face a material risk of dismissal; (4) excessive
compensation does not generally lead to a significant increase in the risk of takeovers; (5) any
increase in the firm's cost of capital as a result of excessive compensation is not likely to be
material; and (6) shareholders are given insufficient legal rights to contest management
compensation. Id. at 775-83.
54. See Westphal & Zajac, supra note 30, at 79 ("[D]emographic similarity between the
CEO and board members was positively related to subsequent increases in CEO
compensation."); see also supra notes 34, 37, and accompanying text (showing that having
CEOs on a board leads to higher executive compensation).
55. See Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom,6 STAN. J. L. Bus. &FIN. 85,86
(2000) (stating that many corporations have embraced diversity, including diversity at the board
level, in an effort to harness it for superior financial performance).
56. See supra note 53 (discussing how the market has proven ineffective at curbing
excessive compensation). Many of the dynamics Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker identify that

GAMES CEOs PLAY AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY

1595

no reason to think that the issue of diversity will be managed more benevolently
than CEO compensation. For example, there are no reports of CEOs being
dismissed for mismanaging diversity at the board level,57 so the threat of
dismissal is most likely even smaller than the threat of dismissal for rent
extraction in the form of excessive compensation. 58 More fundamentally, in the
United States of 2004, race can be counted on to distort market behavior in a
way that gives CEOs more latitude to reject diversity and engage in homosocial
reproduction.59 Thus virtually every mechanism that permits CEOs to extract
rents in the form of excessive compensation would also permit CEOs to wield
more power generally through homosocial reproduction. 6°
In terms of market pressure to diversify, economists, including Nobel
laureate Kenneth Arrow, have already shown that race has often exceeded mere
From automobile sales to labor markets,
economic incentives.6 1
militate against market pressure alone deterring CEOs from extracting rents also apply to the
issue of board diversity. For example, to the extent that CEOs can earn higher compensation as
a result of stacking boards with cronies and cultural siblings, it is very likely that the benefit of
higher compensation exceeds the cost to the CEO stemming from any diminution in firm value
from the lack of a diverse board. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 775-79 (arguing that the
market forces that drive managerial behavior are unlikely to deter excessive executive
compensation).
57. At Westar Energy, in Topeka, Kansas, a "Special Committee of the Board of
Directors" found that a former CEO engaged in a pattern of inappropriate conduct and that a
lack of diversity contributed to poor corporate governance, but that the CEO resigned for
reasons unrelated to diversity in the boardroom. See Westar Energy, Inc., Report of the Special
Committee to the Boardof Directors,Apr. 29, 2003, at 218 (finding that the CEO engaged in
unlawful breaches of fiduciary duty and, consequently, recommended dismissal), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media -files/nys/wr/reports/custom-pagelWestarEnergy.pdf (last
visited Sept. 5, 2004). The Committee also found that the "future composition of the Board
[should] reflect greater diversity," although it found that the present lack of diversity did not
implicate the integrity of any director. Id. at 256-58. The CEO of W.R. Grace was purportedly
forced out amidst allegations that he sexually harassed employees (not board directors), and
commentators subsequently claimed that this was subterfuge for a power struggle. Thomas M.
Burton & Richard Gibson, Fighting to the Death: How 2 Top Officials of Grace Wound Up in
a Very Dirty War, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1995, at Al (suggesting that the chairman of W.R.
Grace decided to fire the CEO at least one month before allegations of sexual harassment were
raised and that the decision came after the CEO and chairman "erupted into a full-scale feud"
over control of the company).
58. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 777 (reporting that threat of dismissal inflicted
an expected cost of $0.30 per $1000 of corporate wealth reduction, meaning that a CEO could
rationally expect costs of $0.30 for every $1000 of excessive compensation).
59. See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 370 (discussing the distorting effects of race on market
behavior in the context of employment).
60. See supra note 53 (listing the reasons why markets have been insufficient to deter
CEOs from extracting rents from their corporations).
61. See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 370-71 (stating that market transactions are also social
events and that transactors bring a whole set of social attitudes to the transaction that are not
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economists have now identified the power of race to cause market distortions
across the American economy, 62 and there is no evidence that CEO gains from
pursuing homosocial reproduction at the board level could somehow be
trumped by market forces that have failed to overcome the pursuit of excessive
compensation and have failed to trump the power of race in a wide variety of
economic contexts.63 Mainstream economics would consequently support the
likelihood that social conventions (such as race) would instead outweigh the
economic pressure to diversify. 64 It is therefore quite easy for CEOs to resist
any need to diversify and continue to pursue homosocial reproduction. When it
comes to explaining race, any market-based model of behavior fails to comport
with reality and has failed to comport with reality throughout our history.65
This is not to say that economic doctrine cannot provide some degree of insight
to explain why many CEOs refrain from diversifying their boards.
While any market-based theory of CEO behavior in selecting directors
suffers from severe infirmities, economic theory can nevertheless help explain
the strategic behavior of CEOs in this context. 66 Game theory suggests that
much behavior can be explained by substituting strategic behavior (where
actors have knowledge of and are influenced by the expected behavior of
others) for mere rational maximization in the context of impersonal markets.67
comprehended by market-based models of behavior).
62. See id. at 367 (stating that "[miarket discrimination in labor, credit, residential, and
other markets persisted for decades under free markets"). See generally Ian Ayres, Further
Evidence of Discriminationin New Car Negotiationsand Estimatesof Its Causes,94 MICH. L.
REv. 109, 142 (1995); William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination
in Employment: Codes of Color,Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (1998); John Yinger,
Evidence on Discriminationin Consumer Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 63.
63. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (asserting that various economists have
found that race distorts markets in the American economy).
64. See Kenneth J. Arrow, What HasEconomics to Say About Race?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.
91, 98 (1998) ("Profit maximization is overcome by the values inherent in the maintenance of
the network or other social interaction.").
65. See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 367 (criticizing the shortcomings of the neoclassical
economic model of racial discrimination).
66. CEO power over director selection often leads to the neutralization of the board in
terms of negotiating compensation. Bebchuck et al., supra note 44, at 764-75. As previously
highlighted, CEOs opting for homogenous boards can expect higher compensation than those
opting for more diverse boards. Supranotes 34-35, 37, and accompanying text. Thus, pursuit
of a diverse board is one element of the executive compensation and director selection dynamic.
Issues of race, however, tend to create additional complexities in market behavior. Board
diversity, then, is both an element in the compensation conundrum, as well as part of more
complex social dynamic.
67. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONoMIcs 462 (5th ed. 2001)
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This strategic behavior is a function of each actor's expected payoffs,
determined in light of the expected behavior of other actors. 68 A fundamental
heuristic of game theory is the Prisoner's Dilemma. 69 The Prisoner's Dilemma
illustrates how two parties striving to maximize their payoffs will conduct
themselves in a way that may not maximize their joint welfare, once they take
into account the behavior of others. 70 Assume two individuals are in custody
for suspicion of a crime. If they cooperate and agree not to testify against each
other, they would serve two-year sentences as the result of a plea bargain. If
one confesses and testifies against the other at trial, the confessor will receive a
one-year sentence, and the other will receive a ten-year sentence. If both
confess, they will receive sentences of five years. 7' Obviously, the best option
is for neither to confess, for they would then only serve a combined four years.
Nevertheless, if they do not know what the other will do, they are each best
served by confessing, which eliminates the worst outcome and creates an
opportunity for the confessor to serve only one year.72 If both do this, which
they rationally may, they jointly serve ten years instead of four. 73 Simply
stated, their 74strategic behavior will prevent both from rationally maximizing
their utility.

(defining a game as any situation in which market participants make strategic decisions that take
into account the actions and responses of others). Game theory has been applied to explain
behavior in an ever increasing number of legal contexts. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Games and
Stories: Game Theory and the Civil FalseClaims Act, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (2004) (using
game theory to examine changes in the regulatory world brought on by the False Claims Act);
Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic View, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 1957 (2004) (applying game theory analysis to the problem of corporate social
responsibility).
68. See PINDYCK & RuBiNFELD, supra note 67, at 462 (describing the general concepts
behind optimal strategies in game theory). The authors state:
The optimal strategy for a player is the one that maximizes [the player's] expected
payoff. We will focus on games involving players who are rational, in the sense
that they think through the consequences of their actions. In essence, we are
concerned with the following question: If I believe that my competitors are rational
and act to maximize their own payoffs, how should I take their behavior into
account when making my decisions?
Id. (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 443-44.
70. See id. (illustrating how the players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game will optimally
choose a strategy that offers them less than the highest possible payoff).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See HowELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 37-43 (2003)
(posing a similar Prisoner's Dilemma and showing that "the game is said to be a dilemma for
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So, will CEOs rationally act to maximize the profitability and value of
their businesses by pursuing a diverse board so that the company will have
additional profits to share with the CEO as the optimal contracting approach
would suggest? 75 I posit they will not always do so. Instead, many will play
the homosocial reproduction game, secure in the knowledge that neither
shareholders nor capital markets will limit their options.76 First, each CEO will
be able to garner enhanced compensation by creating very homogenous boards
complete with other CEOs.7 7 Usually this will outweigh any direct benefit to
the CEO in the form of enhanced firm value.78 Second, any payoffs from
enhanced diversity are likely to accrue to the shareholders and not the CEO;
such an accrual will occur over a long period that can be measured in years, not
quarters. 79 It is much more difficult for a CEO to capture such gains than to
obtain excessive compensation. Third, there is the distorting influence of race.
There is a growing body of scholarship demonstrating the distortions in market
behavior associated with race.80 When a CEO is selecting board candidates,
he is competing in a noncooperative game with other CEOs in the sense
that CEOs will not contract to assure that other CEOs behave in
accordance with expectations. Instead, CEOs will attempt to deduce how

the prisoners because they jointly make themselves worse off when each attempts to pursue his
interest").
75. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (stating that under the optimal
contracting approach, CEOs would seek to minimize the costs associated with divergent
interests of shareholders and management).
76. See supra notes 24, 33, 53, and accompanying text (arguing that shareholders may
have distorted views on race, that shareholders have little control over director elections, and
that market forces are insufficient to deter CEOs from exploiting their power over board
selection).
77. See supra notes 34-35, 37, and accompanying text (discussing homogeneity on
corporate boards).
78. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 774-77 (stating that the economic benefits of
higher CEO salaries outweigh any economic losses from their reduced stock option values or
threat of dismissal).
79. See Ramirez, supra note 55, at 109-23 (articulating the best practices for embracing
diversity, which amount to a cultural transformation of the business culture in an all
encompassing manner-such a transformation requires effort and time).
80. See supra notes 61-62, 65 and accompanying text (discussing the power of race to
cause market distortions and trump economic incentives, and arguing that market-based models
of behavior fail to comport with reality when explaining race).
81. The impossibility of enforceable contracts among CEOs regarding diversity in the
boardroom means that in game theory terminology this is a "noncooperative game." See
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supranote 67, at 443 (defining a "noncooperative game" as a "[g]ame in
which negotiation and enforcement of binding contracts are not possible").
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other CEOs will behave. 82 If enough CEOs succumb to the temptation not
to compete in diversifying their boards, then CEOs will face even less
market pressure to diversify, just as CEOs appear not to compete in terms
of compensation. 8 3 Thus, many CEOs will refrain from pursuing a more
diverse board and seize opportunities for greater control and compensation
arising from homosocial reproduction; in game theory parlance, these are
the payoffs. 84 A complete game theoretic framework is beyond the scope of
this Article. The central point is this: CEOs will have incentives to engage
in strategic behavior to avoid diversification of their board. They will be
tempted to play the homosocial reproduction game, and many will
succumb.
All available evidence supports the game theory explanation for board
selections. CEOs clearly want other CEOs to serve on their boards. CEOs
also mirror directors in other significant demographic ways-including in
terms of race.85 Studies show that when CEOs have power, they choose
more demographically similar board members.86 Shareholders seem largely
insensitive to these facts. CEOs indulging this temptation towards
homosocial reproduction achieve higher payoffs in the form of higher
compensation.8 7 Finally, this homosocial reproduction and excessive
compensation seems associated with inferior corporate governance, leading
to greater CEO power.8 8 All of the pieces of the game theory model fit.
Thus, at least some CEOs appear to be sacrificing sound corporate

82. For example, if the market operated in accordance with the conditions of perfect
competition, there is little doubt that markets would respond appropriately to laggards with
respect to diversity, and CEOs would have much more limited options. See supra note 22
(citing various analyses of the financial impact of diversity that show that companies that
embrace cultural diversity financially outperform companies that do not).
83. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 764-83 (describing the failures of standard
market mechanisms to encourage optimal contracting for CEO compensation).
84. See JACKSON Er AL., supra note 74, at 34-36 (stating that game theory deals with
situations where actors try to maximize payoffs in light of the anticipated conduct of others).
85. See Ramirez, supra note 2, at 838 (showing that only 4.1% of all board seats of
Fortune 1000 companies are held by African Americans and Latinos and that 90% of senior
officers are white males).
86. See supranotes 30, 34, 37, and accompanying text (asserting that executives will seek
to fill boards with demographic and cultural reproductions of themselves, a phenomenon that
leads to higher compensation among CEOs and board members).
87. See supranotes 34-35, 37, and accompanying text (stating that the common practice
of CEOs sitting on each other's boards leads to higher compensation).
88. See supra note 22 (concluding that companies that embrace cultural diversity
outperform companies that do not); supra note 49 (citing recent articles that associate excessive
compensation with poor corporate governance).
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governance and maximum firm value in pursuit of homosocial reproduction
and the expectancy of higher payoffs.
111. Disruptingthe Homosocial Reproduction Game and
Converging Interests
All of this suggests an intriguing interest convergence. With all the power
that CEOs hold in our managerial corporate state, they are not monarchs that
may hold themselves above the law-yet. 89 Very broad constituencies have
large economic stakes in the performance of the macroeconomy. To the extent
that the full costs of our continued apartheid hangover are fully comprehended,
these constituents are a source of potential political and economic power in
favor of reform. 90 Corporate capitalists, while clearly on the wane in terms of
power over the past several decades, are nevertheless powerful and
fundamentally in favor of reducing the power of CEOs.91 Politicians intuitively
fear anti big-business and populist cries for reining in the power of business
elites. 92 Combined with advocates for racial reform, whether Latino, AfricanAmerican, Native-American, white, or Asian-American, these forces would be
a formidable political and economic power. 93 Add to this mix the interest of
feminists in board diversity, and a convincing convergence of interests in favor
of reform emerges. 94
89. See Ramirez, supra note 49, at 31-32,32 n.1 1 (recountingmarketmeltdown in the summerof
2002 and the passage of historic corporate reform in the U.S. Senate by a vote of

97-0).
90.

See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 375 (estimating macroeconomic costs of race in America as

approaching $1 trillion per year).
91. See Ranirez, supra note 2, at 847-48 (stating that many of the largest institutional investors
strongly support more diverse boards); Wendy Tanaka, Silent ParnersNo Longer,Pm- INQ., Apr 22,
2003, at CI (noting that diversity initiatives are one of the top subjects of shareholder proxy proposals).
Institutional investors and shareholder activists are much more educated regarding the potential benefits of
board diversity than the investing public as a whole. It is unclear how institutional shareholder enthusiasm
for diverse boards would interact with putative individual shareholder ambivalence.
92. See Ramirez, supra note 49, at 32 n.1 1,59-61 (positingthatsuchfearexplainsthe97-0vote

on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after years ofpoliticians in Washington voting infavor ofmore lax regulation)
93. See, e.g., Neal Devins, EplainingGtter v.Bollinger, 152 U.PA. L REv. 347,366(2003)
(noting that one measure of the strength of those seeking racial progress was the volume of amici briefs
filed insupport of affinnative action inGrutterv. Boiinger,539 U.S. 306 (2003)). There were 102 amici
briefs filed in Gnater,the great weight of these briefs supported affirmative action inhighereducation. Id.
94. Indeed, recently a group of feminist business leaders formed a council specifically for
the purpose of facilitating the diversification of boardooms-both interms of gender and race. Thor
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Under the once prevailing neoclassical dogma-specifically, public choice
theory-if this admixture of interests truly supported reform and truly had the
power to make reform happen, it would have already occurred. 95 The public
choice approach uses market constructs to explain political dynamics.
Although it has receded in the face of recent attacks, the majority of legal
scholars still think that it can explain some aspects of political action.96 Even a
cursory review of the reforms that occurred during the summer of 2002,
however, suggests the need for prime movers to harness potential political and
economic forces before such forces express themselves in law.97 For example,
a major reworking of the professional rules of responsibility was foisted upon
the influential legal profession at the last minute thanks to the efforts of a small
band of law professors. 98 Prior to this effort, there was virtually no movement
in this direction. 99 Richard Painter is widely credited with being the
prime mover on this historic reform effort.'0° Once Painter began to bring
Valdmanis, Directors' Council Seeks Diversity, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2003, at 2B, 2003 WL
5321444.
95. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the
Modem State: Keep the Bathwater,But Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 31011 (2002) (arguing that public choice, the application of economics and market behavior to law
and regulation, is a poor explanation of political activity).
96. See id. at 311 (noting that most scholars find public choice useful, if not
comprehensive, in explaining political action).
97. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29) (directing the SEC to
promulgate rules requiring attorneys representing publicly held companies and appearing or
practicing before the SEC to undertake new reporting obligations for a "material violation of
law"); Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,
6296-97 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205) (stating that the SEC has not
determined whether further standards of professional conduct are provident, including the
proposed rule requiring a "noisy withdrawal" for counsel with credible evidence of a material
violation of law that has not been appropriately acted upon by a publicly held company).
98. See Otis Bilodeau, Senate Puts CorporateBar in Its Sights, LEGAL TIMEs, July 15,
2002, at 1 (recounting how a letter from forty legal scholars to the SEC led to legislative action
regarding the duties of corporate counsel); Lisa Girion, Attorneys Fear Being Turned Into
Informers, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at C1, 2002 WL 2492345 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley
reforms of the role of corporate counsel was "unprecedented incursion" into traditional state
judicial authority over the professional obligations of attorneys).
99. See Renee Deger, Law ProfessorsLed FightForNew SEC Rules, Say ABA Brought
Problems On, MIMI DAILY Bus. REV., Dec. 13, 2002, at 9 (documenting the efforts of law
professors to reform professional rules of responsibility).
100. See Otis Bilodeau, Painter's Putsch: Richard PainterArgued for Years that
CorporateLaw Needed Policing. Enron Gave Him His Opening., LEGALTImEs, Dec. 30,2002,
at 521. Bilodeau stated:
Painter... was the driving force behind the provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 that targets corporate lawyers. As required under that law, the Securities and
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this issue to life, alert lawmakers were able to divert part of the effort to reform
corporate America to "reform" the role of corporate counsel. 10 ' While lawyers
have recently proven to be an effective force against some elements of the
SEC's reform efforts, Painter has demonstrated the utility of persistent and
opportunistic reform10 2efforts, even in the face of otherwise powerful and
entrenched interests.
So where were the Richard Painters in favor of utilizing these same
pressures for reform to achieve a more diverse reality at the pinnacle of
corporate governance? On one level, this question requires an inquiry into why
those seeking racial justice regarding a single issue-such as affirmative action
or racial profiling-have not themselves internalized one key message of
critical race theory: race is everywhere. 10 3 Consequently, it is expressed across
society, and remedies are likely to span not just the full range of law, but the
full range of social, political, and economic issues. 104 More pointedly, this
Article proposes that those seeking racial reform must be prepared to play
the same game by the same rules of all effective reformers throughout
American history. 10 5 Racial reformers must be prepared to forge coalitions
Exchange Commission has been racing to promulgate new rules designed to force
lawyers to alert a client-company's senior management, and ultimately its board, to
serious wrongdoing.
Id. Painter's effort aroused the resistance of the American Bar Association, the American
Corporate Counsel Association, legal malpractice insurers, and a large part of the corporate bar.
Id.; see also Sue Reisinger, Two State Bars ProtestSEC Rules, NAT'L. L. J., Sept. 15,2003, at 1
(recounting efforts by state bar associations to assert primacy in the regulation of attorneys
notwithstanding Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC's rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley).
101. See Deger, supra note 99, at 9 (explaining how Painter and others were able to effect
reforms).
102. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (documenting Painter's success in
getting reforms passed post-Enron). One measure of the strength of the forces resisting the
Painter reform effort is the recent resistance the SEC has encountered in implementing Section
307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For example, one part of the SEC's efforts was to require
counsel representing publicly held companies to blow the whistle on misconduct to the SEC.
Richard S. Dunham, A Quiet Retreatfor 'Noisy Withdrawal', Bus. WK., May 3, 2004, at 61
(stating that the SEC is hesitating in finalizing a "noisy withdrawal" rule in the face of resistance
from corporate lawyers).
103. See DELGADO & STEFANCic, supra note 1, at 7 ("[R]acism is ordinary, not
aberrational-' normal science,'-the usual way society does business, the common, everyday
experience of most people of color in this country.").
104. The breadth of legal disciplines represented by the articles included in this
Symposium demonstrates the range of race in America.
105. In many ways the Court's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003), illustrates the kind of interest alignment necessary to sway legal elites. Among the many
amici briefs filed, 137 congressional representatives joined briefs on filed in support of the
University of Michigan, while no representative joined briefs supporting the plaintiffs.
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with similarly interested parties along the very broad range of issues where race
is lurking and to apply pressure to the specific political actors with power over
a specific issue.
In my view, the essence of Derrick Bell's convergence theory was wellstated in an entirely different context by Gabriel Kolko in 1963. In The
Triumph of Conservatism, Kolko demonstrated that so-called progressive era
reforms were "invariably controlled" by business leaders and that,
consequently, only reforms they deemed "acceptable or desirable" occurred.'06

Devins, supranote 93, at 367. Twenty-three states joined briefs supporting the university; one
state opposed. Id. Ninety-one colleges and universities supported the defendants, and zero
supported the petitioner. Id. at 367-68. Big business and the military filed briefs supporting
diversity in higher education and demonstrated their need for diversity to achieve their
respective institutional missions. Id. at 366-70. Even the Bush administration could only
muster a half-hearted opposition to the university given the political landscape it faces. Id. at
370-72. Thus:
By approving race-conscious university admissions, the Rehnquist Court echoed
the opinions of Congress, the states, big business, academics, newspapers, and, to a
lesser extent, the Bush administration. In short, rather than join forces with the
politically isolated opponents of affirmative action, the Court issued a ruling that
conformed to social and political forces.
Id. at 347; see also Juan F. Perea, BuscandoAmerica: Why IntegrationandEqual Protection
Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1452 (2004) ("By upholding Michigan's
program not as a remedy for past discrimination but as a source of benefits for all students in the
form of a diverse student body, the Court made its clearest statement yet that affirmative action
is not for Blacks, but for Whites."). Professor Perea is correct in his conclusion; nevertheless,
the thesis of this Article implies that it would be astonishing if our government (including the
judiciary) ever did anything that affirmatively harmed the interests of whites, given their
stranglehold on both political and economic power. Id. at 1446-53. Indeed, one could argue
that such an action would be profoundly undemocratic. I have instead criticized Grutter
because its approach fails to comprehend the devastation that race wreaks upon our entire
society, particularly those elites with interests in the broad success of our economy. For further
discussion, see Ramirez, supra note 16, at 376-77.
106. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM 2-3 (1963) (commenting on
progressive era reforms). Kolko stated:
Progressivism was initially a movement for the political rationalization of business
and industrial conditions, a movement that operated on the assumption that the
general welfare of the community could be best served by satisfying the concrete
needs of business. But the regulation itself was invariably controlled by the leaders
of the regulated industry, and directed toward ends they deemed acceptable or
desirable. In part this came about because the regulatory movements were usually
initiated by the dominant business to be regulated, but it also resulted from the near
universal belief among political leaders in the basic justice of private property... a
belief that ultimately set limits on the leaders' possible actions. It is business
control over politics.., rather than the political regulation of the economy that is
the significant phenomenon of the Progressive Era.
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Just as Brown v. Board of Education107was precisely what American foreign
policy desired, Kolko shows that "the results of progressivism were precisely
what.., business interests desired." 108 Both Bell and Kolko posit that change
occurs on terms acceptable to those with power."19 But, significantly, Bell and
Kolko differ on an important point. Kolko is quite clear that "under conditions
of political capitalism the form of the industrialization process, and of the
political machinery of society, take on those characteristics necessary to fulfill
the peculiar values, attributes, and goals of the ascendant class of that
society."' 0 Nevertheless,
Kolko does not deem the outcome of this fact to be
1
"inexorable destiny." II
Instead, Kolko suggests that reform, though dominated by the preexisting
power establishment, is in fact an outcome of the highly personal characteristics
of those involved-with their own peculiar motives, interests, and
weaknesses." 2 Kolko rejects any thought that the power establishment is any
kind of monolithic, conspiratorial entity." 3 Rather, it is a reflection of the
highly diffused nature of political and economic power in the United States.
During the progressive era, those with specific power over specific reforms
sought specific results. Each of the relevant agents of reform acted out of
certain widely held assumptions and preconceptions. One such preconception
was that "it was proper for an industry to have a decisive voice or veto over the
regulatory process within its sphere of interest." 11 4 Not all business interests
approved of all progressive reforms; what is significant is that crucial elements
107.
108.

Brown v. Bd.of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 280. The New Deal has inspired a similar finding. See COLIN GORDON, NEW
DEALS: BusINEss, LABOR AND PoLMcs IN AMERICA 1920-1935, 4 (1994) ("This study
contributes to a broad stream of interpretation that has stressed the primacy ofbusiness interests
in the formulation of U.S. public policy and the essential conservatism of the New Deal.").
109. See Bell, supra note 1,at 524 ("I contend that... Brown ...cannot be understood
without some consideration of the decision's value to... those whites in policymaking
positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and abroad that would follow
abandonment of segregation."); KOLKO, supra note 106, at 279-80 ("[A]t no point did [the
Progressive Movement]... conflict in a fundamental way with business supremacy... [i]t
was
not a coincidence that the results of progressivism were precisely what many major business
interests desired.").
110. KOLKO, supra note 106, at 302.
111. Id. at 303.
112.

See id. at 2 ("[T]he triumph of conservatism that I ...describe ...was the result not

of any impersonal, mechanistic necessity but of the conscious needs and decisions of specific
men and institutions.").
113. See id. at 282 (denying a common identity or scheme among the power
establishment).
114. See id. at 283 (discussing preconceptions of agents of reform).
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of big business supported all significant progressive reform initiatives." 15 In
other words, reforms were driven by atomistic actors with specific and limited
powers rather than any monolithic elite.'" 6 In contrast, Professor Bell thinks the
nation is dominated by a white monolith-as it well may have been in the
1960s and 1970s, at least when it came to issues of race." 7
Kolko differs less on another important element of Professor Bell's
interest convergence theory. Kolko, like Bell, is open to the possibility that
interest convergence may be an engine of real progress and real reform,
although both admittedly embrace this in a less than fully enthusiastic
fashion.' 18 Kolko holds that the progressive reform movement could have
occurred if realistic alternatives had been promulgated." 9 According to Kolko,
the problem during the progressive era was that few, if any, understood the
dynamics of political capitalism as it then operated. Essentially, reformers
failed to propose measures that big business could support.' 20 In any event,
both Professor Bell and Kolko concur that in the right context progressive
reform can operate in accordance with the needs of the "ascendant class" as
those needs are shaped and aligned by adept reformers.
Assuming that those interested in influencing reforms could operate at this
level and could propose reform initiatives that could appeal to the "ascendant
class," Kolko hypothesizes that a more positive direction for reform is
possible.12 1 Speaking to the progressive era of reforms, Kolko posits that:
"Populism rejected the values of business" and Socialism "suffered from

115. See id. at 283-84 (supporting the concept of the power establishment as individuals
acting individually).
116. See id. at 283 (restating the idea that the power establishment is not a monolithic,
conspiratorial entity).
117. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 1, at 523 ("The interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites."). My point
is that in today's more diverse times (and certainly in tomorrow's even more diverse times) the
operative term should not be "whites" but rather "those elites with power over a given issue."
118. Compare Bell, supra note 1, at 528 ("Further progress to fulfill the mandate of
[Brown v. Board of Education] is possible to the extent that the divergence of racial interests
can be avoided or minimized.") with KoLKo, supra note 106, at 304-05 (stating that the
Progressive Era could have been "radically different" if some group had promulgated a "relevant
measure of fundamental opposition").
119. See KOLKO, supra note 106, at 304 (hypothesizing that interest convergence may have
been one means to effectively enact reforms).
120. See id. at 304-05 (explaining why the progressive movement did not take a different
approach); id. at 286 (explaining why the progressive movement stalled).
121. See id. at 302 (expressing a belief that opportunities like interest convergence might
be effective).
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a fetishistic belief in centralization."' 22 Consequently, there was an intellectual
and political vacuum left in favor of the two major political parties that did not
differ materially on the supremacy of business interests and maintaining the
status quo. "In brief, the Progressive Era was characterized by a paucity of
alternatives to the status quo, a vacuum that permitted political capitalism to
direct the growth of industrialism in America, to shape its politics, [and] to
determine the ground rules for American civilization for the twentieth
century ....
,23
, The issue, according to Kolko, is one of comprehension; elites
will not accept radical reforms that are not in their interests and must be
educated with respect to potential reforms that converge with their interests.
I posit that just as the Populists and Socialists of yesteryear failed to
comprehend fully the context in which they operated, racial reformers of the
twenty-first century have thus far failed to comprehend fully the opportunities
implicit in political capitalism today.124 Durable racial reform is possible to the
extent that it is aligned with the interests of those with political and economic
power. The key is to exploit opportunistically events and political pressure to
achieve reform that is consistent with racial progress. 125 This is the driving
reality of all reform in America. Real and durable change cannot occur in a
democracy without the concurrence of those holding political and economic
power. While one may bemoan the current distribution of political and
economic power, there is little to be gained from dwelling on this point. The
end result is merely to burden racial reform with distribution issues that are far
more prone to headwinds. A more effective approach is to take the current
distribution of economic and political power as a given and find a way to
operate within those constraints.
Certainly, there may be more ideal distributions of wealth and power than
those currently prevailing in the United States. To a certain degree, I have
122. Id. at 304-05.
123. Id. at 305. In a candid snapshot of the attitudes of the business elite regarding the
relationship between business and government, Bankers' Magazine stated in 1901: "The
business... seeks to shape politics and government in a way conducive to his own

prosperity ....More and more the legislatures and the executive powers of the government are
compelled to listen to the demands of organized business interests." Id. at 161-62 (citing
Bankers' Magazine, LXII (1901), 497-99). Bankers' Magazine concluded as of 1901 that the
reason government was not "entirely controlled" by business was because business had not yet
reached "full perfection." Id. at 162. One hundred years later it is difficult to imagine that the
political grip of business interests has diminished, which is why durable reform without the
support of economic power is also difficult to imagine.
124. See Delgado, supra note 7, at 143 (stating that scholars should seek to identify
"moments of interest convergence").
125. For example, Delgado suggests that the War on Terrorism may hold opportunitiesand perils-for communities of color. Id. at 137-43.
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suggested as much.126 Race could become bundled up with these issues
relatively easily, given its historical role as a means of enhancing class
chasms.127 I suggest now that decoupling race from macro-distributional issues
can serve to help eliminate one source of oppression, to the extent racial
progress is achievable without addressing distributional issues. 128 In all events,
law is rarely a source of durable fundamental reform. The ability of the law to
alter a distributional outcome that is essentially acceptable to all major
sources of political and economic power is dubious at best. 129 On the other
hand, there is good reason to think that racial reform is to some degree
achievable within the current framework of economic and political power.
First, the costs of race in terms of destruction of human capital is staggering,
particularly in an era when human capital is increasingly the predominate
source of wealth creation.130 Second, the "ascendant class" is increasingly of

126. See Steven A. Ramirez, Bearing the Costs of lnequality: Brown and the Myth of the
Efficiency/Equality Trade-Off,44 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (showing that enhanced
equality spurs economic performance); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism's
New Fiasco: Globalizationas Exhibit B in the Casefor a New Law and Economics, 24 MICH. J.
INT'L. L. 831, 849-51 (2003) [hereinafter Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism'sNew Fiasco]
(arguing in favor of democratizing international institutions and implementing appropriate
regulatory infrastructures); Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomicsof the New Deal
at 70,62 MD. L. REv. 515,546-61 (2003) (proposing that legislative acts like the G.I. Bill were
highly successful in encouraging achievements among all levels of society, but noting that
similar legislation has failed to be enacted in the post-New Deal era).
127. There has been undeniable racial progress in America, even in the boardrooms of
major corporations. Thus, while it is true that only 4.1% of all Fortune 1000 directors are
African-American or Latino, this is certainly a very high multiple of the number of such
directors in, for instance, 1953. See supra note 2 (providing statistics regarding minority board
membership).
128. My own suspicion is that too much reform energy is being expended on issues where
political and economic elites, consisting mostly of white males, have little interest in common
with communities of color. Specifically, the issues of affirmative action (often mistaken for
unlawful quotas) and reparations, while founded on powerful notions ofjustice and equity, may
well impede the forging of effective interest convergence coalitions. In fact, these issues can be
recast in ways that highlight the commonality our society harbors with respect to racial progress,
as Justice O'Connor did in finding diversity in higher education to be a "compelling state
interest." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also William Raspberry, Optional
Reparations,WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A23 (proposing that reparations might be effective
if they offered an approach that was "fair to everybody").
129. I am much more sanguine about possible distributional reform that is coupled with
enhanced macroeconomic performance. See Ramirez, Market Fundamentalism'sNew Fiasco,
supranote 126, at 849-51 (noting that countries with the most successful economic growth also
provide educational investments for everyone).
130. See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 372-75 (discussing racial discrimination and its impact
on human capital).
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color and diverse. 3 ' Third, compared with any other era of American
history, the "ascendant class" realizes the untapped potential of people of color
in the United States.' 32 Fourth, in contrast to the dark ages of race, when the
vast majority of society truly believed in race-based differences that were
largely dictated by genetic consequences of racial phenotypes, today's holders
of political and economic power are increasingly aware that race is an illusion
133
and that all of its social consequences are the result of its social construction.
Finally, in coming years, it will be inescapably clearer that allowing the effects
of yesteryear's racial hierarchy to malinger and fester will entail
macroeconomic catastrophe. 134 These factors taken together suggest that there
will be episodes of opportunity for racial reformers to align their interests with
the interests of the "ascendant class," such that
breakthroughs like Brown or the
135
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are possible again.
Of course, none of this is "inexorable destiny."' 36 The only elements that
are inexorable are that continuation of today's racial paradigm will be
increasingly costly and that opportunities to align interests with politically
potent forces will increase. The theory of interest alignment articulated in this
Article, however, requires prime movers to exploit a new paradigm that will
simply be more open to racial reform.' 37 In order to align interests with the
current and future holders of power over relevant areas of potential reform,
coordinated campaigns of education and persuasion must be undertaken,
focusing on the most powerful atomistic interests that can be marshaled in favor
of reform. 38 This is precisely what occurred in 1954 when the NAACP
131.

See Ramirez, supra note 55, at 91 n.15 (showing that communities of color will

constitute one-half of the population and that women are entering the workforce at a
disproportionate rate).
132. See Kevin M. Williams, A Month to Remember, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2002, at Al, 2002
WL 2618871 (noting that highly successful African Americans are now legion in America, as
statesmen, presidential advisors, judges, performing artists, athletics, writers, and doctors, and
their success is widely trumpeted, at least at times).
133. The scientific fact that race is a social construct has now reached mainstream media.
Race: The Powerof an Illusion (California Newsreel 2003), availableat http://www.pbs.org/

race/000_General/000_00-Home.htm (last visited Aug 29, 2004).
134. See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 371 (noting that racism "results in underdeveloped
human capital on a massive scale throughout society").
135. Professor Bell has suggested as much. Bell, supra note 1, at 528.
136. KOLKO, supranote 106, at 303.
137. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing interest alignment in the
context of recent reforms made in the area of professional responsibility).
138. Richard Painter apparently mobilized a cadre of prominent law professors and was
successful because of the political context facing Senator John Edwards. This illustrates well
the opportunities available to racial reformers in terms of mounting support for timely

GAMES CEOs PLAYAND INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY

1609

convinced nine Supreme Court justices to move boldly away from "separate but
equal" to racial integration.139 The NAACP coordinated a concerted campaign
to persuade nine white males endowed with political power over the specific
issue of segregation in public education to fundamentally rewrite American
constitutional law. 140
This is also precisely what could have occurred when Congress and other
regulatory authorities imposed the far-reaching Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002141
and related reform initiatives.142 A key element of the initiative was to limit
CEO power. 43 Restricting CEO power over the director selection process
would have been a natural extension of this initiative.' 44 Indeed, since the
passage of the Act, the SEC has taken affinative steps to restrict CEO power
over director selection. 41 First, the SEC issued rules requiring publicly held
companies to disclose information relating to their director selection processes
and the function of any nomination committees. 46 Second, the SEC proposed
initiatives.
139. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954) (overturning the doctrine of
"separate but equal" and ordering the racial integration of schools).
140. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS INTHE COURTS 163-75,177-99 (1994) (recounting
the assiduous efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund to amass social
science and political support for overturning segregation in education).
141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29). For an overview of the
effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Ramirez, supra note 2, at 842-44. Essentially, the Act
limited management autonomy (and therefore CEO power) over the audit function, the legal
function, and imposed an enhanced role for directors that are not dependent upon management
for payments other than directors' fees. Id. at 843-44. See also Annual Review of Federal
SecuritiesRegulation, 58 Bus. LAw. 747,748 (2003) [hereinafter Annual Review] (providing a
detailed overview of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
142. Both the NYSE and the NASDAQ Marketplace imposed new listing requirements that
enhanced board independence from management. Ramirez, supra note 2, at 843-44; see also
Annual Review, supra note 141, at 748 (providing a detailed overview of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002).
143. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing similar provisions in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
144. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (same); infra notes 145-46
(discussing recent SEC regulation of the nomination and election of directors in public
companies).
145. There is no doubt that the SEC has run into significant political resistance in its
initiatives to trim CEO power. See Dunham, supranote 102, at 61 (discussing hesitation by the
SEC in promulgating rules regarding "noisy withdrawal" in light of complaints voiced by
corporate lawyers); see also Amy Borrus, SEC Reform: Big Biz Says Enough Already, Bus.
WEEK, FEB. 2, 2004, at 43 (noting opposition to the corporate reforms). Nevertheless, my point
is that the time to strike for reforms was at the same time that Richard Painter struck-spring
and summer of 2002.
146. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
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rules broadening the rights of shareholders to nominate directors. 147
Throughout 2002 and 2003, there was significant political and regulatory
pressure in favor of trimming CEO prerogatives.148 In fact, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act passed the Senate by a vote of ninety-seven to zero; it is difficult to imagine
a more powerful
context for lasting reform of corporate governance at the
149
federal level.

This Article cannot answer these queries:150 whether the Sarbanes-Oxley
reform initiatives 51 could have included provisions weakening CEO
prerogatives over board selection (thereby disrupting homosocial reproduction
and enhancing diversity within corporate America); or whether the Act could
have directly required measures to enhance diversity in the boardroom (thereby
weakening CEO prerogatives over board selection).152 Presumably, however,
insulating the CEO from the director selection process-by, for
example, requiring an independent nominating committee-would limit
homosocial reproduction in three important ways. First, to the extent director-

Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. 69204 (Dec. 11, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, and 274) (adopting new disclosure
requirements and amendments to existing disclosure requirements to enhance the transparency
of the operations of boards of directors).
147. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (proposed rules, Oct.
23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, and 274) (proposing new rules that would,
under certain circumstances, require companies to include in their proxy materials security
holder nominees for election as director).
148. See supra notes 97, 141-42, 146-47, and accompanying text (discussing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and other proposed changes to securities law).
149. See supra note 92 (suggesting that politicians' fear of antibig business and populist
cries for reining in the power of business elites explains the unanimous vote for the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 after years of voting in favor of more lax regulation).
150. It is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Article to articulate an ideal director
selection process for purposes of enhancing diversity while achieving more optimal corporate
governance. Consequently, I can only address the viability of general approaches to the issue of
how to disrupt homosocial reproduction.
151. I specifically mean to include within these initiatives: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles
11, 15, 18, 28, and 29); Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. 69204 (Dec.
11, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, and 274); Security Holder
Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (proposed October 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, and 274); and the NYSE and NASDAQ Marketplace reforms. See supra
notes 97, 140-41, 145-46 (discussing these initiatives and the conditions surrounding them).
152. See Ranirez, supra note 55, at 124-32 (proposing that publicly held companies be
required to disclose to the investing public their policies and approaches to diversity
management (which would include diversity in the boardroom) and that directors be stripped of
business judgment rule protection for mismanaging diversity).
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selection power is shifted from the CEO to independent board members, it
is shifted to individuals with diminished incentives to indulge in homosocial
reproduction because unlike the CEO, the new directors would generally not be
setting the compensation package for those who selected them. 153 Second, the
selectors-independent directors-would now be a slightly more diverse group
than management, and their reduced inclination for homosocial reproduction
would be more favorable in terms of diversity. 54 Therefore, any legal
mechanism that shifted selection power for new directors to the board and away
from the CEO would likely lead to a significant uptick in the presence of
diversity in the boardrooms of corporate America as well as an improvement in
corporate governance.155
Although there were many influential interests in favor of restricting CEO
power over the board of directors, the political and regulatory process still
defies prediction. 56 There was a wealth of recent scholarship suggesting that
diverse boards would enhance board scrutiny of CEO action.1 57 In a broad
political sense, the environment was ripe for real reform, and there was some
recognition that the hold of the CEO over most boardrooms was a root problem
of the crisis in investor confidence in the summer of 2002.158 Moreover, there
is constant political pressure for measures that would tend to erase embedded
racial inequality within our society. 159 On the other hand, management
interests wield considerable power, and recent events suggest there are limits
to the degree to which law can rein in this power, at least in a
153. See supra notes 34-35, 37 and accompanying text (supporting the proposition that the
phenomenon of mutually interlocking boards of directors, particularly those made up of CEOs
of other companies, leads to higher compensation for CEOs).
154. See Westphal & Zajac, supra note 30, at 77 (noting that directors seek demographic
similarity when they have more power relative to the CEO); supra note 4 (noting that the corps
of directors is slightly more diverse than the corps of CEOs)
155. Until recently, there was some degree of skepticism that corporate governance even
mattered in terms of firm performance. Today, the consensus is that it does. See Ramirez,
supra note 2, at 854 n.101 (stating that "corporate governance matters to financial

performance").
156. See supra note 95-96 and accompanying text (noting the shortcomings of public
choice theory as applied to racial issues); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporatingthe AdministrativeProcess, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1,4-5 (1998) (articulating four
competing theories of regulation and finding that none squares with reality).
157. See supra note 20 (noting the benefits of diverse boards and their tendency to avoid
like-mindedness and groupthink).
158. See Ramirez, FearandSocial Capitalism,supra note 88, at 63 (discussing the state of
investor confidence in the summer of 2002).
159. This political pressure was also manifest in the volume of amici briefs submitted in
the Grutter case. See supra note 104 (discussing the large number of amici briefs filed in
support of the University).
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more ordinary environment than that which prevailed in 2002-03.160 Thus, in
the final analysis, the question of whether CEO power over the director
nomination process would command sufficient political and economic support
to become a durable feature of American corporate law is a question that can
only be answered in a nonhypothetical manner after some
racial reformer plays
161
the hand that our system of political capitalism deals.
IV. Conclusion
The United States is a capitalist democracy. Consequently, the law in the
United States responds to political and economic power. The American legal
system is also a highly diffused system. Therefore, reformers must orchestrate
political and economic power to bring pressure to bear upon the specific legal
actors vested with responsibility over a particular issue if they wish to achieve
durable reform. Interest convergence theory is the key to reform and progress
in any area of law from race to corporate governance. As Derrick Bell has
correctly stated: "Further progress to fulfill the mandate of Brown is possible to
the extent that the divergence of racial interests can be avoided or
minimized." 162 The converse of Bell's observation is equally true: To the
extent interest convergence is maximized, reform opportunities are maximized.
This Article seeks to extend interest convergence theory to its logical endsspecifically, to include the possibility that interests can be aligned to further the
goal of reform, racial or otherwise. This possibility can come to fruition when
individuals seeking specific reforms can convince specific individuals with
economic or political power over that specific issue. This is essentially what
the NAACP achieved in the Brown decision. This alignment of interests was
achieved in the Grutter opinion fifty years later, where it succeeded in
securing qualified support for affirmative action from a fundamentally
160. While it is true that CEO power is a factor that must be considered in crafting any
corporate governance reform, it is also true that many influential voices are beginning to
understand that the relationship between the CEO and the board must give primacy to the
monitoring duties of directors, rather than any obligation that directors have to furnish
operational advice to the CEO. See No More Mr. Nice Guy, THE ECONOMIST, March 20, 2004,
at 15 ("The primary function of independent board directors... is to monitor the firm's
managers, not to give strategic or managerial advice, and directors should allow nothing to
impair their monitoring role."). Thus, there will be continuing pressure for reform.
161. See KOLKO, supra note 106, at 3 (defining political capitalism as the use of politics
and law to secure conditions of stability, predictability, and security for the ascendant class). I
prefer the term social capitalism, connoting a broader set of beneficiaries. Ramirez, supranote
49, at 37.
162. Bell, supra note 1, at 528.

GAMES CEOs PLAY AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY

1613

conservative Court. It also explains Richard Painter's efforts to relandscape
professional responsibility for attorneys representing publicly held companies.
In each case, economic and political power was brought to bear on lawmakers
vested with specific power over a specific issue.
The Article also seeks to illustrate these points in the specific context of
corporate corruption and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Act presented
an historic opportunity to facilitate more diverse boards. In the end, this reform
was forestalled in favor of weaker reforms that will not contribute to the goal of
racial reform in any material way. This Article posits that this result flows
more from the fact that there was no prime mover striving to forge an interest
alignment sufficient to accomplish the specific reforms needed to enhance
board diversity than from either the merits of any particular proposal or the
support any proposal may have inspired. The lesson to be learned from this
reality is the lesson of this Symposium. Race is everywhere; therefore,
possibilities for racial reform are similarly ubiquitous. It is even present within
issues related to CEO domination of the director selection process. CEOs play
the game of homosocial reproduction when selecting directors. Given our
apartheid tradition, this means that the upper echelons of corporate America
will be essentially the exclusive province of white males far into the future.
But, because board diversity can improve corporate governance, racial
reformers may find many allies that can serve to facilitate reform in this arena.
The challenge is to find economic and political interests that can gain either
from enhanced diversity or from improved corporate governance and to educate
and mobilize those interests.

